Agoda (com.agoda.mobile.consumer): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Agoda.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Agoda
NYSE
2026-06-27
90d ago
Silent
Critical
Agoda, based in Thailand, a country the EU has not approved as offering adequate data protection, routes technical data from your payment device through Chinese infrastructure subject to China's National Intelligence Law, and separately to US servers. The app also trusts certificates a user could be tricked into installing, meaning anyone on the same network could intercept all of its traffic, and it captures your screen, microphone and movement activity without disclosing any of it.
Booking Holdings subsidiary (Bangkok, Thailand - no EU adequacy). Alipay + Alipay Mobile Security SDK (apmobilesecuritysdk + mobilesecuritysdk, Ant Group CN) - EU payment device telemetry routed through Chinese infrastructure subject to China NatIntelLaw Art. 7. Braze (1384 classes) with location, push, and persistent storage to US infrastructure. AppsFlyer (460 classes) cross-app attribution. 4× pre-consent auto-init: AnalyticsInitProvider (initOrder=9999) + AppStartTimeProvider/com.booking.perfsuite (9999) + FirebaseInitProvider (100) + MobileAdsInitProvider/Google Ads (100). Firebase keys AIzaSyDfFR8B4OUA7qwjbSA6jxbYdOnba-RW6o8 + Maps AIzaSyCoox8MGhZNVHgObAggGuK3GVY1_7OzOos hardcoded. User certificates trusted in base network config - all traffic interceptable by proxy. DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE + RECORD_AUDIO + ACTIVITY_RECOGNITION undisclosed. Dual TH+CN third-country transfer without Art. 46 safeguards documented. Five messages sent across 77 days to privacy@/security@/dpo@agoda.com; not one reply of any kind was ever received. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, on the stated embargo date. BCC: DSB + BfDI + CERT.at.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 44-46GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 13+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published
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This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.