Aidu.de (de.unister.aidu): Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Aidu.de.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Aidu.de
Private
2026-06-27
90d ago
ACK
Medium
Aidu.de takes full-screen recordings of what you do in the app and sends them to a US company before you have given consent. The backend configuration inside the app actually points to a different travel brand entirely, meaning the company you think is handling your data may not be the one that actually processes it, and a separate behavioural profiling system runs without ever being disclosed.
Aidu.de / Invia Group (de.unister.aidu). UXCamContentProvider (screenshot session recording) fires before Usercentrics CMP - full-screen captures taken before consent dialog shown, transmitted to UXCam US. Firebase project id = "ab-in-den-urlaub-flutter-prod" ≠ Aidu.de - different brand/product in backend config. Art. 13(1)(a): disclosed controller identity does not match actual processing entity; potential undisclosed Art. 26 joint-controller with Ab-in-den-Urlaub.de. Usercentrics (330 classes) present but bypassed: FirebaseInitProvider initOrder=100 + Adjust SystemLifecycleContentProvider fire first. Exponea/Bloomreach CDP (1,016 classes, largest SDK) - full behavioral CDP undisclosed as Art. 13 processor. RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED. Flutter app. Google API key AIzaSyC034I0DZCxhouznHchcvRfiNcq12kY1l4 hardcoded. BfDI = lead authority. Original aidu.de addresses hard-bounced (domain does not resolve for mail); redirected to verified successor Invia.de. One identity-verification reply received 2026-07-20 (Mirko Richter, cc recht@invia.de), no substantive answer to any of three open questions across four further follow-ups. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, on the stated embargo date. BCC: BfDI + DSB + CERT.at.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 6GDPR Art. 13(1)(a)GDPR Art. 13
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.