Air Canada (com.aircanada.mobile): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Air Canada.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Air Canada
NYSE
2026-06-27
90d ago
Silent
High
Air Canada's app contains the specific technology needed to extract fingerprints and iris scans from the chip inside an EU biometric passport, going beyond the basic passport-reading most travel apps use. It runs that alongside separate device-fingerprinting software on the very same device handling your passport data, and includes the same disguised security tool found hidden in other travel apps in this audit series.
com.aircanada.mobile. All findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. Air Canada (Montreal, CA). JMRTD (166 classes) implements APDULevelEACTACapable - Extended Access Control Terminal Authentication, the ICAO 9303 protocol required exclusively to access DG3 (ten-print fingerprints) and DG4 (iris scans) from EU biometric passport chips. BAC/PACE = DG1+DG2 only; EAC-TA goes further. OARO (475 classes: bio + documentscanner + nfcpassportreader + onboarding) = user-facing biometric pipeline layer. Full support stack: BouncyCastle post-quantum crypto + EJBCA CVC cert management + net.sf.scuba smart-card NFC + jj2000 JPEG2000 decoder. LexisNexis ThreatMetrix (37 classes) device fingerprinting + MobileShield (21 classes) running on same device handling passport biometric data - server-side linkage = Art. 35(3)(b) DPIA mandatory. CyberfEnd (16 classes) - 3rd consecutive travel app containing this obfuscated SDK (trivago→Amadeus→Air Canada). WRITE_SETTINGS + CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE + CHANGE_WIFI_STATE undocumented. Firebase key AIzaSyBJgQEakXrAEcX9Fbb47RRXL0uO3TP-OsQ hardcoded, project aircanada-app. BCC: DSB + BfDI + CNIL + CERT.at. Offer: €54,000 / €225,000.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 9GDPR Art. 44
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.