We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for ASOS.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
ASOS
LSE
2026-06-30
109d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
ASOS deploys Google's full advertising-profiling tool inside a fashion app, building interest groups and topic categories from your shopping behaviour that can indirectly reveal things like your body measurements and style preferences. The app also reads your phone's fixed hardware identifier with no identifiable reason, and several tracking tools are already running before consent, even though the app displays a consent banner that does not actually block these trackers.
com.asos.app. ASOS plc (LON:ASC, ~GBP 3.5B revenue, EU market DE/AT/NL/FR/ES, 61,525 smali classes). C1: Firebase Key AIzaSyBjDhrCleBF1kfOoCbHggHWRq0HAHDWhPI + DB api-project-498109357888.firebaseio.com + Braze API Key d0bf68d2-1d8d-4c54-bfda-bc49cb303311 hardcoded (EU endpoint fra-02.braze.eu, 523 Braze classes). H1: Full Android Privacy Sandbox stack, TOPICS + CUSTOM_AUDIENCE + ATTRIBUTION + AD_ID x2 on a fashion app (body measurements, style preferences = possible Art. 9(1) GDPR inference). H2: READ_PHONE_STATE (IMEI) on a fashion shopping app, no identifiable purpose. H3: ContentSquare CSAutoStart + Google Mobile Ads (initOrder=100) pre-consent DESPITE a OneTrust CMP (consent-management failure). H4: Klarna 356 classes + AppsFlyer + Facebook + 4x BOOT_COMPLETED. R1 sent 2026-06-30. DSB + EDPS in CC. Embargo 2026-09-28. Deadline 2026-07-14. Five messages over 109 days drew zero substantive reply, only one bounce notification. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 19 days after the embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
this is a useless cookie banner. it's just here to look like one * we don't use cookies, so there's nothing to consent to. don't let anyone tell you otherwise.two buttons, one closes this and throws some confetti. the other literally does nothing.