bank99 (AT) (at.bank99.meine.meine): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for bank99 (AT).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
bank99 (AT)
Private
2026-06-25
92d ago
Silent
Critical
bank99's banking app loads its login page with no certificate protection at all, so anyone on the same network as you could intercept your login session, and it allows unsafe scripting on exactly that banking screen. The app also starts advertising tracking before you have given consent, and it carries an access key hardcoded directly into the code, sitting exposed in the software.
at.bank99.meine.meine v1.0.39. All findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0, F1 confirmed CRITICAL on the computed score alone. F1: no certificate pinning at any layer - the banking login WebView loads meine.bank99.at with no NSC/CertificatePinner, trivial MITM. F2: unsafe-eval + unsafe-inline in the banking WebView CSP. F3: Firebase key AIzaSyD8jtdT06oePLqFohurEF8yjmEopM5Jx_4 hardcoded. F4: Adjust Attribution SDK (obfuscated) + FirebaseInitProvider pre-consent on the banking app. R3 sent 2026-06-29: Internal Black Box + Form Attack + Publication Gag - all three patterns named. DSB BCC'd since R1. Deadline 2026-07-09.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 32
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.