BILD (Axel Springer) (com.netbiscuits.bild.android): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for BILD (Axel Springer).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
BILD (Axel Springer)
Private
2026-06-21
90d ago
Substantive
High
BILD runs six different advertising and tracking companies inside its app, and layers Google's interest-based Topics system on top while you are reading political news. Simply opening an article about politics feeds a detailed advertising profile of you across all of these vendors at once.
3,354 smali ad-tech stack (Teads+Braze+Sourcepoint+Permutive+AppsFlyer+Xandr). Google Topics API on political news. DPO Philipp Kaste engaged - internal review underway.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32(1)GDPR Art. 32(1)GDPR Art. 25+3
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.