We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Binance.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Binance
PRIVATE
2026-07-02
107d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Binance's app runs a China-linked analytics SDK before you have given any consent, and a separate push-notification SDK leaves four internal components open to any other app on your device, a real security weakness. When RFI-IRFOS raised this, Binance's own data-protection office first said the matter was not its responsibility and pointed to a bug-bounty program, then in the very same reply asked for more detail in case it actually was a data-protection issue, a response that contradicts itself instead of answering the question.
com.binance.dev v3.16.7. Root-level code analysis findings under coordinated disclosure (REF BINANCE-2026-R1-001). H1: SensorsData SDK with a China nexus, active before any user consent. H2: JPush SDK with 4 exported Android components reachable by any other app on the device. Automated PR/DPO acknowledgements received. 2026-07-07: DPO office replied claiming the enquiry "falls outside the scope of the DPO Team's assistance," pointed to the Bug Bounty Program, yet in the same reply asked for more detail "if specifically a data protection issue" - a self-contradicting non-answer. RFI-IRFOS replied same day restating H1+H2 verbatim and declining the bug-bounty framing. Seven messages drew only automated acknowledgments and bug-bounty redirects, none engaging the two HIGH findings. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 17 days after the 2026-09-30 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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