We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for BlaBlaCar.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
BlaBlaCar
PRIVATE
2026-06-27
112d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
BlaBlaCar scans your ID document and compares it to a live photo of your face for identity verification, and separately feeds your behaviour into a Russian analytics tool that any other app on your phone can read from, a tool whose data Russian state law can access. It also tracks your location continuously even when you are not actively taking or offering a ride, extending beyond the trip itself.
BlaBlaCar SAS (Paris, FR). Onfido biometric ID verification (4,275 classes, com.onfido.android.sdk.capture, :onfido_process) - passport/ID scan + live facial biometric comparison = Art. 9(1) special category; DPIA under Art. 35(3)(b) mandatory. Yandex AppMetrica (5,092 classes, io.appmetrica.analytics): PreloadInfoContentProvider exported=true (readable by all device apps) + Russian NatIntelLaw / SORM-3 state access risk = Art. 13(1)(f) + Art. 44 Chapter V failure. YooMoney/Sberbank (Russian state bank) cleartext HTTP in NSC: cleartextTrafficPermitted="true" for certs.yoomoney.ru. Datadog RUM (2,844 classes, DdRumContentProvider pre-consent). Facebook (4,340 classes). OneTrust (1,669 classes) bypassed: MobileAdsInitProvider (100) + FirebaseInitProvider (100) + VungleProvider (102) + AudienceNetworkContentProvider fire before consent. ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION + FOREGROUND_SERVICE_LOCATION: continuous tracking outside active rides. All 4 Privacy Sandbox APIs. Cash App Zipline (dynamic code execution). A Google API key is hardcoded (value redacted in the public report), project comuto.com:gme-comuto. CNIL = lead authority. BCC: CNIL + CERT.at. Six messages over 112 days drew zero replies of any kind; the original disclosure and the CNIL BCC both hard-bounced on day one. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 20 days after the 2026-09-27 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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