We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Bluecode.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Bluecode
PRIVATE
2026-07-05
104d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Bluecode's payment app includes the code needed to verify you are really connecting to its real payment server, but that protection is never switched on. Marketing tools inside the app are also notified the exact instant you scan a QR code or confirm a payment, before you have been asked for consent, turning something as ordinary as paying for coffee into a tracked behavioural event.
com.spt.bluecode. QR-code instant-payment scheme (AT/DE/BE/LU). No certificate pinning on the payment-authorization channel despite the app shipping its own unused OkHttp CertificatePinner class. Pre-consent Firebase auto-init wired to named payment-lifecycle events (qr_code_scanned, confirm_payment, payment_successful). Ad-attribution surface open to all callers (allowAllToAccess=true) on a scan-and-pay app. Correctly designated Art. 27 EU representative (Secure Payment Technologies GmbH, Innsbruck) - no representative gap Five messages over 63 days drew no reply and none of the three questions answered. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 14 days after the 2026-10-03 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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