ChatGPT (OpenAI) (com.openai.chatgpt): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for ChatGPT (OpenAI).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
ChatGPT (OpenAI)
Private
2026-06-28
89d ago
CS deflect
High
ChatGPT's Android app runs a biometric face-and-ID check counted as special-category data with no disclosed legal basis, links financial account access to the app, and starts tracking before a user can consent, a fact OpenAI's own automated support system admitted in writing, not merely something RFI-IRFOS alleges. The company never engaged the substance across 89 days and four separate support tickets.
com.openai.chatgpt. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. Persona biometric identity verification (facial liveness + document scan, Art. 9, no disclosed legal basis) reaches HIGH on the computed CVSS score alone. Pre-consent Firebase init via directBootAware is held at HIGH via blast-radius escalation, not primarily for scale but because an OpenAI automated support summary on case 10550708 stated verbatim: "Your Android app initializes tracking and analytics before users can provide consent," a written admission and GDPR Art. 83(2)(b) aggravating factor. Segment analytics, screen-capture monitoring (DETECT_SCREEN_CAPTURE), and undisclosed Plaid financial-account integration + READ_CONTACTS correct to MEDIUM. Across 89 days and four separate OpenAI support case numbers, two auto-closed via customer-satisfaction survey, no human privacy or DPO reply was ever received.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 13(1)(e)GDPR Art. 9(1)+2
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
89d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.