We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Coinbase.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Coinbase
NASDAQ
2026-07-02
107d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
Coinbase's app treats your tracking consent as already granted before you are ever asked, and opens its advertising data to any other app on your phone that requests it. It also embeds a screen-recording tool with no confirmed protection hiding what it captures, on an app that tracks your wallet and transactions, and ships a working database address and access key inside the app itself. When RFI-IRFOS reported this, Coinbase's security team redirected the report to its bug-bounty program instead of treating it as a data-protection matter. On 2026-09-01, Coinbase's internal ticketing system auto-closed the case as "Resolution: Fixed," citing that same July redirect as the resolution, and characterized the unanswered follow-ups since as a "disclosure-pressure/extortion pattern." The same closure notice states two paragraphs later that independent technical verification of the findings "is tracked separately and not blocked by this closure," claiming the issue is fixed while admitting it was never checked. security@coinbase.com has sent exactly one message in this case's entire history. Every other reply, before and after the closure, has been an automated acknowledgment arriving within 15 seconds. The findings remain unremediated and unanswered as of publication.
com.coinbase.android v14.24.32 (REF CB-2026-R1-001). Google Analytics/Firebase consent-mode defaults hardcoded "granted" with zero CMP in the binary; AdServices/Privacy Sandbox allowAllToAccess="true" on all 3 surfaces; Firebase key + live RTDB URL hardcoded; Datadog Session Replay in a financial app with unverified field masking. security@coinbase.com redirected to their HackerOne bug-bounty program - escalated same day, one floor up, DPO+security jointly. Six messages drew one redirect to the bug-bounty platform and no answer on the merits of the two CRITICAL findings; one regulator address bounced. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 17 days after the 2026-09-30 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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