Diagnosia (AT) (com.diagnosia.fachinformation): Privacy & Security Findings

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On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Diagnosia (AT).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Diagnosia (AT)
Private
2026-06-25
89d ago
Resolved
Medium
Diagnosia, a professional drug-reference app, confirmed initializing Firebase and Sentry before any consent screen renders, and has since gated the parts of that initialization that generated an actual token or analytics event, on a tool whose lookup history implies patient conditions being treated (Art. 9 by inference).
Firebase + Sentry pre-consent ContentProvider auto-init CONFIRMED (Leitner reply 2026-08-13 did not dispute these providers): com.google.firebase.provider.FirebaseInitProvider + io.sentry.android.core.SentryInitProvider / SentryPerformanceProvider fire on process start, pre-consent, on a medical drug-lookup app. Correction: the original headline stated this as confirmed third-party tracking. The operator repeatedly asked for a concrete transmission proof, endpoint, timing, data category, which RFI-IRFOS never supplied, only the confirmed pre-consent initialization timing. The claim is corrected to what is actually verified, SDK initialization before consent, not a confirmed data transfer. Partial remediation confirmed live 2026-09-21 against a freshly pulled build: io.sentry.auto-init=false (since v7.1.1) and firebase_messaging_auto_init_enabled=false plus firebase_analytics_collection_enabled=false (since v7.1.2) stop the automatic Sentry init path and the automatic FCM registration respectively; the bare ContentProviders still register and still initialize unconditionally at process start, so pre-consent SDK bootstrap continues, but automatic token generation and analytics collection are now gated. Facebook SDK claim WITHDRAWN 2026-08-13: com/facebook/… smali traced to React Native (com.facebook.react), not an embedded Meta SDK. C2 (search-history backup) WITHDRAWN 2026-08-14: both secure_store_backup_rules.xml and secure_store_data_extraction_rules.xml scope to the sharedpref domain only (SecureStore sub-path excluded); the app persists via Room/expo-sqlite (database domain), which neither rule includes. RFI-IRFOS's original report had already quoted the rule correctly but overreached in its conclusion; withdrawn in full. Firebase API key (AIzaSy…bLZA, project diagnosia-android) hardcoded and confirmed unrotated, byte-identical since the original June audit; the operator's claimed Application/API restriction, package name plus SHA-1 binding, limited to the FCM Registration, Firebase Cloud Messaging and Firebase Installations APIs, is now independently confirmed, both from a live-supplied console screenshot and from the same key value re-extracted from the current binary. Of ten originally-listed abuse paths, eight require Firebase SDKs (Firestore/Storage/Auth/Functions/Remote Config) that are absent from the binary and were withdrawn 2026-08-14; FCM token/quota abuse remains structurally possible, and Firebase App Check is not integrated anywhere in the app (zero client-integrity gate). Operator corrected: Österreichische Apotheker-Verlagsgesellschaft m.b.H. (Vienna), successor by merger to the originally-named Diagnosia Internetservices GmbH (merged 2021-09-01). BCC: DSB + BMG. Case closed 2026-09-22: all three closure conditions RFI-IRFOS itself named on 2026-09-16, verified key restriction, verified FCM auto-init gating, verified Sentry auto-init gating, are independently confirmed. FCM token enumeration, the US CLOUD Act third-country question, and the Art. 9 classification of search history remain on record as RFI-IRFOS's own ongoing observations, not as findings still blocking closure against the current build. Severity corrected from CRITICAL to MEDIUM at closure: the two findings that justified CRITICAL, H3 (Facebook/Meta SDK) and C2 (search-history backup exposure), were both withdrawn in full, and C1, the one finding that stands, scores MEDIUM under CVSS v4.0 (6.9) in RFI-IRFOS's own final report. No standing finding in this case supports a CRITICAL rating any longer.
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GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 9(2)GDPR Art. 6(1)/7+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
89d 00h 00m 00s
Published

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.