We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Dundle.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Dundle
PRIVATE
2026-07-06
103d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Dundle's app defaults your tracking consent to allowed before you have made any choice, even though the code contains a real custom consent system that simply is not switched on. Session-recording tools can capture what you type and tap at checkout, and the production app ships hardcoded access keys, including to a leftover test database and an internal staging server, neither of which should be reachable from the version you actually download.
com.dundle.app. European gift-card/voucher marketplace (Korsit B.V., Eindhoven, Netherlands). Google/Firebase Consent Mode defaults to "granted" before any user choice, despite a genuine custom TrackingConsentService existing in the Dart codebase. No certificate pinning or network security config anywhere, including the checkout flow. Hardcoded Firebase API key. Two separate Supabase project references with embedded anon JWTs hardcoded in the production binary - one appears to be a leftover non-production project. Datadog Session Replay and Microsoft Clarity both bundled on a checkout-flow app. A staging Azure backend domain shipped inside the production build. Genuinely good: a public named security contact (rare in this programme), real custom consent-tracking code, cleartext blocked by default, server-driven payment method selection, passwordless OTP, Keystore-backed secure storage, no plaintext voucher-code storage, proportionate permissions, no Chinese or Russian SDKs found. Five messages over 103 days drew no reply. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 13 days after the 2026-10-04 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
this is a useless cookie banner. it's just here to look like one * we don't use cookies, so there's nothing to consent to. don't let anyone tell you otherwise.two buttons, one closes this and throws some confetti. the other literally does nothing.