Good Calendar (BetterAppTech) (calendar.agenda.calendarplanner.agendaplanner): Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Good Calendar (BetterAppTech).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Good Calendar (BetterAppTech)
Private
2026-06-25
92d ago
Resolved
Medium
A calendar app that can already read your schedule and your entire contact list also connects to four separate advertising networks and requests every Android advertising-tracking permission that exists, turning the times you plan things and the people you know into material that can follow you into other apps' advertising. Four of the developer's own contact addresses bounced outright, and across eleven messages over more than two months, nobody ever replied.
calendar.agenda.calendarplanner.agendaplanner v2.07.17.0617. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0: pre-consent AdMob and Firebase init on an app holding READ_CALENDAR + READ_CONTACTS, all four Privacy Sandbox permissions (including ACCESS_ADSERVICES_CUSTOM_AUDIENCE) feeding a four-network ad stack, and hardcoded Firebase/AdMob/S3 credentials all correct to MEDIUM; an undocumented RECORD_AUDIO permission and an overlay/background-process permission set both correct to LOW. Eleven messages sent across 79 days; kalender@, privacy@, info@, and contact@betterapptech.com all bounced, calendar@ and support@betterapptech.com accepted delivery for the rest. No reply of any kind, automated or human, was ever received. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, six days after the 2026-09-19 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 5(1)(b)GDPR Art. 13(1)(c)+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.