IDZ Digital / Timpy (IN): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
Skip to content

Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for IDZ Digital / Timpy (IN).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
IDZ Digital / Timpy (IN)
Private
2026-06-25
92d ago
Silent
High
A single Indian company runs three separate toddler apps, marketed under three different names, that all run a full advertising-mediation stack and collect an advertising identifier from a two-in-three ratio of the apps, with tracking starting before any parent-facing consent screen even appears. No child in the one-to-three age range this portfolio targets can legally consent to any of it. Across five messages sent directly to the company's own named directors, nobody ever replied.
IDZ Digital Private Limited (India), addressed directly by corporate registration and named directors. Three apps rated and marketed for children aged 1-3, published under three trading names ("iz", Timpy Games, KidloLand): Infant Games 1-2 v1.2.2, Tizi Town v3.1.5, Unicorn Dress-Up v2.6.8. Re-scored under CVSS v4.0: full advertising mediation stack (Google Ads, Unity Ads, ironSource/Supersonic, Vungle) + ACCESS_ADSERVICES_AD_ID in two of three apps + pre-consent FirebaseInitProvider across all three computes to MEDIUM/6.9 alone, held at HIGH under blast-radius escalation since no child in the targeted age range can give valid consent under any circumstance. Five messages sent across 8 days to five confirmed-delivered addresses; not one reply of any kind was ever received. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, six days after the stated 2026-09-19 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 8
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.