iJoysoft Camera (photo.cam.filter.beauty.effect): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for iJoysoft Camera.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
iJoysoft Camera
Private
2026-06-25
92d ago
Silent
High
This camera and photo-filter app has fully built and connected machinery for uploading your photos, pointed at infrastructure that includes Chinese servers, though the exact trigger and destination are deliberately obfuscated so it cannot be proven that photos are actually sent, only that everything needed to do so is wired up and ready. The same app also exposes your advertising ID to three separate Chinese ad networks and starts tracking before you have given consent. Across twelve messages sent to the only contact address this company provides, over more than two months, nobody ever replied.
photo.cam.filter.beauty.effect v2.1.9, iJoysoft. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. Fully wired image-upload machinery (bitmap compression + multipart JPEG upload, 17+19 compiled classes) is built and integrated, pointed at infrastructure including Chinese and Alibaba Cloud endpoints, reaches HIGH/8.2 on the computed CVSS score alone; the exact destination is obfuscated and constructed at runtime, so this finding does not assert photos are actually uploaded, only that the capability exists, correction from an earlier internal note that stated this as fact. Advertising-ID exposure to Chinese ad networks (Pangle, Mintegral, Tencent) via Alibaba/.cn infrastructure, an explicit cleartext-traffic override with a hardcoded developer LAN IP, pre-consent ad SDK init, and a broad permission footprint with extractable keys all correct to MEDIUM. Twelve messages sent across 79 days to the single generic contact address iJoysoft uses across its entire app network; not one reply of any kind was ever received. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, six days after the stated 2026-09-19 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 44GDPR Art. 7
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.