We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for ivie.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
ivie
PUBLIC
2026-07-06
103d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Vienna's official tourism app tells users it continuously tracks their exact location, but the code behind it only checks your position at set trigger points, so the privacy notice describes more tracking than the app actually performs. More seriously, it stores your City Card number, ticket and booking codes in plain, unprotected storage on the phone, while a secure storage option the app already uses elsewhere goes unused here. The privacy policy also says Facebook is used only for login, but the app runs Facebook's advertising-tracking and install-attribution tools, and a prize draw tied to the Eurovision challenge has no age check despite likely minors entering.
at.vienna.ivie. Vienna's official city-guide app and Eurovision Song Contest 2026 Host City App, operated by Wiener Tourismusverband (public-law body). The app's own copy claims it collects "exact background location data (always)" for a proximity-notification/treasure-hunt feature, but the binary confirms an efficient event-driven Geofencing API, not continuous polling - a transparency mismatch that overstates the actual processing. Firebase ContentProvider pre-consent auto-init despite a genuinely working OneTrust CMP with real per-vendor consent categories. Vienna City Card data (card number, tickets, booking code, PII) stored in a plaintext local database while the app has its own Keystore-backed encrypted storage used elsewhere but not here. Six hardcoded dev/staging endpoints in production. Privacy policy states Facebook is "login only" while the binary bundles Facebook App Events and Install Referrer attribution components. No age-gate found for the prize-drawing tied to the ESC challenge despite plausible minor participation. A cease-and-desist letter from the association's lawyers on 2026-09-03 came instead of an answer; none of the technical questions was answered. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 13 days after the 2026-10-04 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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