We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for LAOLA1.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
LAOLA1
PRIVATE
2026-07-01
108d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
LAOLA1's sports app starts three separate tracking tools before its own consent banner has even appeared, and reads your advertising identifier regardless. It also allows cloud backups that can include your login tokens, so both your account access and your viewing habits are exposed before you have agreed to any tracking at all.
at.laola1. LAOLA1 Multimedia GmbH (AT), sport streaming. Pre-consent auto-init (INFOnline IOMB + CleverPush + Blaze) BEFORE the TRUENDO CMP; GAID actively read; extractable Firebase key AIzaSyBi6im7… ; allowBackup=true cloud-backup incl. OAuth tokens. Positive: no gambling/Chinese/Russian SDK. R1 2026-07-01. Ten messages over 72 days drew no reply, no acknowledgment and none of the three questions answered. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 18 days after the 2026-09-29 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
this is a useless cookie banner. it's just here to look like one * we don't use cookies, so there's nothing to consent to. don't let anyone tell you otherwise.two buttons, one closes this and throws some confetti. the other literally does nothing.