Last War: Survival (com.fun.lastwar.gp): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Last War: Survival.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Last War: Survival
Private
2026-06-23
94d ago
CS deflect
High
Every player who uses voice chat in this war game has their audio routed through Tencent, a company legally compellable to cooperate with Chinese state intelligence, a fact never disclosed in the game's privacy policy. When RFI-IRFOS raised this, staff using FunPlus and FirstFun addresses debated the technical details for months, including one response confirming server location but never answering which legal transfer mechanism actually covers the data, before a separate FunPlus corporate office wrote to deny the title was theirs at all.
com.fun.lastwar.gp, 60M+ installs. All seven findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. Tencent GME (885 compiled classes) routes in-game voice audio through PRC-subject infrastructure, reaching HIGH/8.7 on the computed CVSS score alone, no escalation needed. Hardcoded Facebook client token, ThinkingData Chinese analytics bridged with AppsFlyer attribution, unrestricted cleartext traffic, and AIHelp Chinese support processing all correct to MEDIUM. Undisclosed calendar writes correct to LOW. Twelve messages sent across 70 days to a rotating set of funplus.com/firstfun.com/lastwar.com addresses; three automated survey closures, one substantive technical response on 24 August rebutted point by point on 1 September (Tencent's own server-placement confirmation did not answer the Art. 44 transfer-mechanism question), and a separate FunPlus GC Office message on 1 September disputing that the title is a FunPlus product, sent after FunPlus-affiliated addresses had already engaged substantively on the app's own SDK configuration for over two months. No reply followed the 1 September rebuttal. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, one day after the stated 2026-09-24 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 44
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
94d 00h 00m 00s
Published
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This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.