We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Magenta SmartHome.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Magenta SmartHome
XETRA
2026-07-01
108d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Deutsche Telekom's smart-home app controls your cameras, door locks and presence sensors, but still allows fully unencrypted connections and adds extra marketing and tracking tools whose data cannot be confirmed to stay in Germany or the EU, meaning it may go to the US instead. The most sensitive parts of your home end up with weaker protection than the company's own German-hosted infrastructure would suggest.
de.telekom.smarthomeb2c. Deutsche Telekom AG (QIVICON). Self-hosts Countly + Sentry on its own German cloud (Bosch-grade instinct) yet still bolts on MoEngage + Adjust + Usabilla marketing/attribution - on an app that controls cameras, door locks and presence sensors. Global cleartext, no NSC, no pinning. MoEngage data region unverifiable (possible US transfer). Cleaner than Tuya/TCL/Midea, not Bosch-clean. R1 2026-07-01. Deutsche Telekom itself has never once substantively replied across seven written messages; the North Rhine-Westphalia data protection authority, copied throughout, responded 2026-09-17 that a manufacturer is not itself a GDPR controller, a position RFI-IRFOS contests on the basis that Telekom operates this service, its own backend, and the end-user relationship directly, rather than selling a product a separate customer deploys. Eight messages drew two automatic acknowledgments and no substantive reply from the company; the state regulator declined jurisdiction and our counter-position stayed unanswered. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 18 days after the 2026-09-29 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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