Meowdoku (com.oakever.meowdoku): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Meowdoku.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Meowdoku
Private
2026-06-25
92d ago
Waiting
Medium
This puzzle game is built so that a user-tracking system always finishes its work before any consent screen could technically even appear, and separately sends player data to Russian and Chinese advertising companies with no approved EU data-protection agreement covering either transfer.
com.oakever.meowdoku v1.6.0. All six findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0 and correct to MEDIUM on their computed bands. A user-tagging ContentProvider set to initOrder=20000, the highest value found anywhere in the binary, is architected to fire before the Application class, any UI thread, or a consent dialog can exist. Two Russian ad networks (MyTarget/VK Group, Yandex Mobile Ads) and a Chinese ad SDK (Meevii) route EU user data to jurisdictions without an EU adequacy decision, and neither transfer carries a documented Art. 46 safeguard. Four messages sent across 92 days, the first bouncing repeatedly before a working address was found, zero reply of any kind ever received.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 25GDPR Art. 44GDPR Art. 44+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.