We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Muslim Pro.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Muslim Pro
PRIVATE
2026-06-28
111d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
Muslim Pro, used by more than 100 million people to log prayer times, fasting and Quran reading, treats that information as religious behaviour under GDPR's special-category rules, yet routes it through two separate Chinese-linked advertising pipelines and tracks your precise location before you have given consent. Smali evidence from the production v17.9 build confirms location is read at device boot. Across three disclosure rounds and seven notices, four of six findings remain unaddressed by the developer.
com.bitsmedia.android.muslimpro. Bitsmedia Pte Ltd (Singapore), 100M+ users, prayer/fasting/Quran logs = Art. 9 religious data. ByteDance/Pangle (125 smali) + Tencent IMSDK (80, LocationElement) = two China NSL pipelines — both confirmed on-device in v17.9. 3x BOOT_COMPLETED + FINE_LOCATION pre-consent, confirmed via smali (PrayerTimeNotificationReceiver.onReceive reads Location.getShortFriendlyPlaceName at boot). Facebook ContentProvider exported, no permission. Firebase key AIzaSyAINEoY3d4s_PxbyU-4clVZ4IyFg6HdvLU. Prebid RTB (412 smali). Three disclosure rounds: R1 2026-06-28, first genuine human reply 2026-09-22 from Head of Product & Engineering (partial deflection on C1+C3, four findings entirely unacknowledged), R2 2026-09-23 rebutting deflection, R3 2026-09-25 with smali evidence and on-device verification. No response after R3. Embargo 2026-09-26 passed with C2, H1, H2, H3 unaddressed. Public disclosure 2026-10-17.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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