OÖNachrichten (AT) (de.fcms.webapp.oon): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for OÖNachrichten (AT).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
OÖNachrichten (AT)
Private
2026-06-21
90d ago
Substantive
Critical
OÖNachrichten, a regional Austrian newspaper, hardcodes an access key into its app and argues this is harmless because the key is deliberately public. RFI-IRFOS laid out fifteen concrete ways that exposure could be abused, including a well-documented architectural weakness in how Google enforces these restrictions generally, without carrying out a live attack against the publisher's own systems, and asked the publisher to demonstrate the specific safeguards that would close the gap, even though the publisher had proactively reported a related issue to the data protection authority itself.
OÖNachrichten (Nachrichten Verlags GmbH, Linz). C1: Firebase API Key AIzaSyDGhlIBg3y8IQ7bh5szBm0MwrPGSjddiN0 hardcoded (project: ooen-app). H1 (no NSC) + H2 (allowBackup=true) confirmed in writing by OÖN. H2: OÖN proactively filed an Art. 33 GDPR notification with the DSB. C1 disputed: "public by design". R2 sent 2026-06-30 with 15 concrete attack scenarios: quota DoS, FCM phishing blast, user enumeration via identitytoolkit, password-reset flood, Realtime DB read+write, Firestore dump, storage enumeration, Remote Config leak, analytics poisoning, missing App Check, Application Restriction bypass, session-token harvesting, competitive intelligence, subscriber profiling — documented from static analysis as a plausible attack surface, not independently live-tested against OÖN's own project. The Application Restriction scenario specifically: Google enforces Android key restrictions via client-supplied HTTP headers (package name + certificate SHA-1), not cryptographic device attestation — a documented general weakness in how this control works, distinct from any live exploit attempt. DSB + EDPS in BCC. Embargo 2026-09-19.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32(1)GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)GDPR Art. 13(1)(e)+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.