We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for PayLife SESAM.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
PayLife SESAM
WBAG
2026-07-06
103d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
PayLife presents itself as an independent payment provider, but the app's own code confirms it is simply a brand of BAWAG P.S.K. bank. Despite running a full digital wallet, the app has no confirmed active protection against a fake server impersonating the real one, and marketing and feedback tools hosted in the US start collecting data before you have made any consent choice, inside an app regulated as a bank.
at.paylife.sesam. Headline finding is not a vulnerability but an identity fact: "PayLife" is not an independent payment operator - the Application class (com.bawagpsk.bawagpsk.App), an internal pref key (BAWAG_PSK_FINGERPRINT_SHARED_PREFS), and BAWAG's own imprint all confirm PayLife is a brand of BAWAG P.S.K. AG. No network_security_config.xml and no confirmed active certificate pinning on a full digital-banking/payment wallet, despite unused pinning-capable code in the binary. Pre-consent Firebase/ML Kit auto-init with no named CMP found - partial credit for Google Consent Mode v2 defaults set to deny. Marketing/feedback SDKs (Braze, Usabilla, Countly, US-hosted) embedded in a regulated bank app. Genuinely strong card-data handling: masked-PAN-only storage, EncryptedSharedPreferences/AndroidKeyStore, SQLCipher, biometric-bound keys, full backup/transfer exclusion Seven messages over 103 days drew no reply and none of the three questions answered. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 13 days after the 2026-10-04 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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