Pinterest: Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Pinterest.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Pinterest
NYSE
2026-06-26
91d ago
CS deflect
High
Pinterest allows most of its app's network traffic, aside from seven specifically protected domains, to travel unencrypted where it can be intercepted, and embeds a Japanese-Korean SDK that was not listed among the company's disclosed data processors at the time this was checked. Across eight separate attempts to reach the company's security and privacy teams over three months, every single reply came from the press office's auto-responder, and not one word ever came from anyone who could actually address the findings.
com.pinterest. Two of six original findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0 with full evidence recovered for closure: global cleartext traffic (NSC base-config protects only 7 named domains, everything else open to interception) reaches HIGH on the computed CVSS score alone. Undisclosed LINE Corporation SDK (42 smali classes, routing authentication data to Japan and South Korea, absent from Pinterest Europe Ltd's published processor list at time of disclosure) is MEDIUM. Eight messages sent across 91 days to security@pinterest.com and privacy@pinterest.com, cc press@pinterest.com and legal@pinterest.com. All eight replies were the identical automated press-team out-of-office. Zero words, ever, from security, privacy, or legal.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 7+2
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
91d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.