We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Red Bull Mobile eSIM.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Red Bull Mobile eSIM
WBAG
2026-07-01
108d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
The Red Bull Mobile eSIM app, run by A1, starts four separate tracking companies at once with no consent tool in place at all, so data tied to your mobile identity can be collected before you have agreed to anything. The app also routes through US infrastructure with no EU contact named anywhere inside it.
com.redbull.android.esim. Controller A1 Telekom Austria AG (WNDR white-label build, US backend esim.redbullmobile.us on Azure). C1: four-vendor telemetry (Firebase Analytics + auto-on Crashlytics + Adjust with advertising-ID + Braze) auto-inits with NO consent-management platform - tracking can fire before consent. Firebase key hardcoded. No Art. 27 rep in binary. A1 Legal initially flagged our disclosure as suspected fraud; rebutted (a fraudster does not copy the DSB) - DSB now visible in CC. R1 2026-07-01. Six messages drew three personal replies from the operator, a review under way since August and no answer to four concrete questions. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 18 days after the 2026-09-29 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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