running.COACH (AT): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for running.COACH (AT).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
running.COACH (AT)
Private
2026-06-22
94d ago
Silent
Critical
running.COACH's privacy policy says no data is shared with third parties, yet the app backs up training and heart-rate data to Google, sends activity data to Huawei, and, most seriously, has no network security file whatsoever, so real-time heart-rate data sent while running on gym or public WiFi has no protection at all against interception.
me.runningcoach. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0: the app ships with no Network Security Configuration file at all, not merely an empty one, meaning zero certificate pinning and cleartext permitted on older Android, for real-time Health Connect heart-rate data (CRITICAL via blast-radius escalation given realistic use on gym/race/public WiFi). A hardcoded Firebase key and undisclosed Huawei HMS (7 smali classes, corrected from a previously overstated 412) and Sentry (1,136 classes) recipients correct to MEDIUM; a backup-exposure finding corrects to LOW. Ten-plus messages sent across three separate contact channels (direct, Zendesk, a shared DPO address) over 95 days, after an initial attempt to the UK ICO was blocked by a recipient mail rule. Zero reply of any kind ever received on any channel.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 13(1)(e)GDPR Art. 32+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
94d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.