MySantander (DE) (de.santander.presentation): Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for MySantander (DE).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
MySantander (DE)
NYSE
2026-06-25
92d ago
Silent
Medium
Santander's German banking app is, by the standard of everything else reviewed in this campaign, genuinely well built: real certificate pinning, a clean permission set, no unnecessary tracking before consent. The three remaining items are minor hygiene questions, not security holes, an unconfirmed legal basis for one marketing SDK, an extractable API key worth double-checking, and a backup certificate pin that should exist but apparently does not yet. Even so, across eight messages over nearly two months, nobody at Santander ever replied, not even to accept credit for a clean build.
de.santander.presentation v2.81.0, Santander Consumer Bank AG, DE. NYSE: SAN (Banco Santander parent). Correction: an earlier internal note wrongly described this app as having pre-consent Firebase init and missing network security config, the real R1 explicitly leads with the opposite, this is among the cleanest builds in the entire campaign, certificate pinning implemented and validating correctly, no AD_ID/location/microphone permissions, minimal pre-consent surface. All three findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0, all correct to MEDIUM: unresolved lawful basis for the Adjust attribution SDK (AD_ID itself deliberately not declared, a privacy-conscious choice), an extractable Firebase key, and a single certificate pin with no backup, framed explicitly as a resilience gap, not a security hole. Eight messages sent across 51 days to datenschutz@santander.de; not one reply of any kind was ever received, not even an acknowledgment of an unusually positive report. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, six days after the stated 2026-09-19 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 13
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.