Shell (com.shell.sitibv.retail): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Shell.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Shell
LSE
2026-06-25
92d ago
Waiting
High
Shell's fuel and loyalty app, which stores payment card and key-fob data, ships a Facebook-built debugging bridge inside its production payment code that, if switched on, would let any device on the same WiFi network read payment tokens and loyalty data without a password, and separately, an optional Chinese payment option routes transaction data through a company legally required to hand data to Chinese state intelligence on request. Shell never engaged enough for RFI-IRFOS to confirm whether the debugging bridge is actually switched on right now.
com.shell.sitibv.retail v8.5.0. All nine findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. A Facebook Stetho debug inspector compiled into the production payment binary and an optional WeChat Pay pipeline routed through Tencent, a PRC-NSL-obligated processor, both reach HIGH on the computed CVSS score alone, no editorial escalation needed; Stetho's activation state could not be confirmed by static analysis and the dynamic verification that would have settled it was never reached. Pre-consent Firebase initialization, a dual APM stack, advertising-ID attribution, two hardcoded Firebase keys, and an undisclosed Braintree processor correct to MEDIUM. A boot-time auto-start receiver corrects to OBSERVATIONAL, an undocumented RECORD_AUDIO permission corrects to LOW. Nine messages sent across 92 days, cycling through five addresses after repeated bounces; one automated acknowledgment received 31 July 2026, zero substantive reply ever.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 44-49+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.