We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Skyscanner.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Skyscanner
NASDAQ
2026-06-27
112d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
Skyscanner has no consent tool in the app at all, yet it tracks your precise location and sets up virtual boundaries that trigger marketing messages as you physically move around. Because its parent company is based in China, your travel plans, including your itineraries and booking details, ultimately sit under a corporate structure subject to China's national-security law, something the app never discloses.
Skyscanner Ltd (Edinburgh, UK) / Trip.com Group (Ctrip, Shanghai, CN). No consent management platform - zero CMP in app with ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION + ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION. New Relic APM/RUM (781 classes): NewRelicAppContentProvider initOrder=200 fires before any consent mechanism. Braze (869 classes incl. obfuscated bo/app package): BrazeGeofence - physical location boundaries trigger marketing events; RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED resumes at boot. Trip.com Group (Ctrip) Chinese parent: all EU user data (travel itineraries, location, booking data) ultimately under entity subject to China NatIntelLaw Art. 7 - undisclosed under Art. 13(1)(f). HUMAN Security HSBotDefender + HSAccountDefender (18 classes): device fingerprinting/behavioral telemetry, undisclosed processor. Branch.io deep-link attribution (18 classes). Qualtrics in-app behavioral surveys (219 classes). Google API keys AIzaSyAe2OtF… + Maps AIzaSyCEGVd3… hardcoded, project api-project-768202461730. ICO = lead authority. BCC: ICO + CERT.at. Seven messages over 77 days drew two automated receipts and no substantive reply from Skyscanner; a third party that answered one message stated it does not act for Skyscanner. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 20 days after the 2026-09-27 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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