report - rfi-irfos
The SquadData SolutionsWorld ModelEvidenceAccess

Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.

This is what a Security engagement produces. See what you’d receive →

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Smart Life (Tuya).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Smart Life (Tuya)
NYSE
2026-06-30
109d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
Smart Life, from a company listed on the New York Stock Exchange but based in China, asks for 27 separate health permissions, including your blood pressure, heart rate and blood-oxygen readings, plus full control over your home cameras, microphones, door locks and location. Every server address the app talks to is hidden inside code that users cannot inspect, so nobody outside the company can actually verify where any of that health and home data ends up.
com.tuya.smartlife. Hangzhou Thing / Tuya Inc. (PRC, NYSE: TUYA). 27 Android Health Connect permissions - READ blood pressure / heart rate / SpO2 - plus a health-AI module on a smart-home app (Art. 9). Whole-home surveillance: camera/NVR, mic, NFC door lock, geofence + background location. Alibaba/Tencent/ByteDance components; every server address hidden in an encrypted, whitebox-protected region-routing bundle users cannot inspect. Embedded mini-program code engine. Hardcoded Tuya app-secret. Twin of the already-critical Tuya Smart. R1 2026-06-30. Nine messages over 68 days, zero replies of any kind, no bounce, no acknowledgment. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 19 days after the 2026-09-28 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 9GDPR Art. 35(3)(c)GDPR Art. 44-49+2
YES
CLOSED
DISCLOSURE
109d 00h 00m 00s
PUBLISHED

this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026

© 2026 RFI-IRFOS  ·  Graz, Austria  ·  GISA 39261441  ·  UID ATU83405245

Foundation

Intelligence

World Model

Applications

Repositories

Crates (crates.io)

all packages →

this is a useless cookie banner. it's just here to look like one * we don't use cookies, so there's nothing to consent to. don't let anyone tell you otherwise.two buttons, one closes this and throws some confetti. the other literally does nothing.