We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for SPAR Plus.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
SPAR Plus
PRIVATE
2026-06-30
109d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
SPAR's shopping app hardcodes the access key that controls customer logins and consent records for its entire identity system directly into the app's code, so anyone who extracts it could potentially impersonate a user against SPAR's own systems. The app also starts setting up invisible location zones around you the moment your phone starts, before you have even opened the app or agreed to anything, in order to send you push messages near stores, and it can read your address book.
plus.spar.si. SPAR d.o.o. Ljubljana (SPAR Slovenia / SPAR International Holding, Salzburg). C1: 2x Firebase Keys + Maps Key + DB spar-plus-si.firebaseio.com hardcoded. C2: SAP Gigya CIAM API Key 4_ABGJQhCXS9xOu0OaOBpYcQ hardcoded (eu2.gigya.com), Gigya manages user identities, login flows and consent records; this key allows direct authentication against SPAR's identity infrastructure; not an analytics key but a CIAM key. H1: Emarsys RegisterGeofencesOnBootCompletedReceiver, registers geofence zones at system boot before the first app launch and before consent, permanent location monitoring for store-proximity push marketing. + ReadPhoneContactsTask in SPAR's own code + ACCESS_ADSERVICES + Firebase pre-consent reserved. R1 sent 2026-06-30. DSB + EDPS + IP Slovenia in CC. Embargo 2026-09-28. Deadline 2026-07-14. SPAR Plus: disclosed 2026-06-30, 9 messages over 109 days, three of four addresses undeliverable throughout, no reply from SPAR (only automated acknowledgments from the Slovenian regulator), published 2026-10-17, 19 days past the 2026-09-28 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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