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387+
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567+
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132+
SDK instances mapped
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Showing the report for Temu.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Temu
NASDAQ
2026-06-20
91d ago
Waiting
Critical
Files inside Temu's own app reveal it runs on the same codebase as Pinduoduo, a Chinese company under data-security scrutiny, despite presenting itself to EU users under the distant-sounding "Whaleco" name. It also contains an entire undisclosed chat and social-messaging system.
com.baogong.* namespaces confirm the app is a Pinduoduo/PDD Holdings codebase; "Whaleco" is a shell, the real controller is a mainland Chinese company under the National Security and Data Security Laws. 626 classes of undisclosed chat/social infrastructure. Braintree payment SDK present with no named processor.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 13(1)(a)PRC National Intelligence Law Art. 7GDPR Art. 5(1)(b)+1
This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.