Too Good To Go (com.app.tgtg): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Too Good To Go.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Too Good To Go
Private
2026-06-24
93d ago
Silent
Medium
Too Good To Go, used by tens of millions of people to rescue surplus food, built a real consent dialog into the app, and then shipped code that starts three separate tracking systems before that dialog ever appears, sending purchase and location data to US companies. When RFI-IRFOS asked about it seven separate times, every single reply was the identical automated template pointing to the privacy policy, as though having a written policy on file proves the app actually follows it. No human ever engaged with a single finding.
com.app.tgtg v26.6.10. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0, correction: earlier internal note named AppsFlyer, the real stack confirmed in the AndroidManifest is Salesforce Marketing Cloud, Firebase, and Facebook, all three auto-initializing via ContentProvider before the app's own consent dialog renders. Salesforce's dedicated location receiver and behavioral profiling, and Braze's purchase-tracking JavaScript bridge, both route to US infrastructure. A hardcoded Facebook client token all correct to MEDIUM. Undocumented calendar read/write corrects to LOW. Seven messages sent across 62 days, every single one drew an identical automated canned-response template, named explicitly as Pattern 1, Policy-as-Implementation-Proof. Not one substantive human reply was ever received. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, one day after the stated 2026-09-24 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 46GDPR Art. 46
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
93d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.