TK Maxx (com.tjx.tkmaxx): Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for TK Maxx.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
TK Maxx
NYSE
2026-06-25
92d ago
Waiting
High
TK Maxx records exactly where a shopper taps and what they do at checkout, replays that session if the app crashes, links it to the shopper's identity, and sends it to a US-based processor, none of it disclosed as session recording anywhere in the app's privacy documentation. The app can also have new tracking scripts injected into it at any time without an app store update or user notice.
com.tjx.tkmaxx. All seven findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. Dynatrace OneAgent, configured for touch-interaction recording, crash session replay, and user identification in the checkout flow, reaches HIGH on the computed CVSS score alone, no escalation needed. Dual pre-consent SDK init (ML Kit + Firebase), Google Tag Manager runtime tracking injection, disproportionate precise location, and ad-attribution tracking correct to MEDIUM. Missing network security config corrects to MEDIUM. Sixteen messages sent across 92 days, cycling through four addresses after repeated bounces, zero reply ever received.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 5(1)(a)GDPR Art. 5(1)(a)
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.