We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Trade Republic.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Trade Republic
PRIVATE
2026-07-06
103d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Trade Republic's own privacy notice admits it uses a tracking tool to build personalised ads and to credit your trading activity to influencers and affiliate marketers who referred you, alongside a live experimentation platform, all before you have been given any consent screen. Confirming your identity for the account means your face is checked by three separate outside companies, sometimes repeatedly, and a children's account product runs on the exact same tracking setup. When RFI-IRFOS escalated this formally, Trade Republic sent back the same automated in-app help-center reply four times over 19 days, on a bank licensed to handle securities trades and crypto custody, without looping in any regulator kept informed throughout.
de.traderepublic.app. BaFin-licensed German neobroker (securities trading, SEPA transfers, savings plans, crypto custody). Operator's own live privacy notice admits Adjust is used to display "personalized ads" and attribute customer behavior to "affiliate marketing partners or influencers" - independently corroborated by a branded app.tr.adjust.com endpoint, alongside Braze and a live GrowthBook experimentation platform. No active certificate pinning (network_security_config ships only a debug-overrides block). Pre-consent Firebase/ML Kit/BOOT_COMPLETED auto-init with no CMP and, unlike a comparable audit in this programme, no Consent Mode v2 mitigation at all. Three separate biometric/facial-data processors (Fourthline, WebID Solutions, AWS Rekognition Face Liveness) including recurring re-authentication. A "Junior" minor-account product and non-customer "Savings Patron" data flow coexist with the same tracking stack. Genuinely good: real anti-screen-capture code, self-hosted Sentry with screenshot/view-hierarchy capture deliberately disabled, full backup/transfer exclusion, named regulated KYC/custody vendors. No ad-serving or session-replay SDK found. Seven automated help-center replies and one template reply with an empty placeholder drew no substantive answer to the eight findings. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 13 days after the 2026-10-04 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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