TripAdvisor (com.tripadvisor.tripadvisor): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for TripAdvisor.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
TripAdvisor
NASDAQ
2026-06-27
90d ago
Silent
High
TripAdvisor records the exact rhythm of every single character you type, treating your typing pattern itself as a form of biometric identification, and combines that with a separate hardware fingerprint of your device before sending both to the US. It bypasses its own consent tool to do this, and allows more than fifty hotel and advertising partners to receive your data over connections with no encryption.
TripAdvisor LLC (Massachusetts, US). BehavioSec (LexisNexis Risk Solutions, 24 classes): registerKeyboardTarget + keyboardTargetTextChanged fires on EVERY character typed - keystroke dynamics = behavioral biometrics under Art. 9. BehavioWebView$TMXCallbackHandler proves BehavioSec is integrated with LexisNexis ThreatMetrix (53 classes) device fingerprinting - behavioral + hardware identity joined before US transmission. DPIA under Art. 35(3)(b) mandatory, not discretionary. OneTrust CMP (466 classes) present but bypassed: FirebaseInitProvider + MobileAdsInitProvider both initOrder=100 fire before consent. 50+ third-party hotel booking/ad domains with cleartextTrafficPermitted=true incl. doubleclick.net, doubleverify.com, expedia.com, agoda.net, amazonaws.com. Braze (442 classes) + AppsFlyer (432 classes) undisclosed US sub-processors. Three Privacy Sandbox APIs simultaneously (AD_ID + ATTRIBUTION + TOPICS) + RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED + FOREGROUND_SERVICE_LOCATION. Firebase keys AIzaSyDlYn-hW-KiUgjE62jNRl0ffHmbmL6ajq8 + AIzaSyB7v8Byw4j_O7FUs9L216qsfafFKkAG5M8 hardcoded. DPC Ireland = lead authority. Six messages sent across 77 days; security@/dpo@tripadvisor.com hard-bounced. TripAdvisor itself never substantively replied; one automated administrative note came from the Irish DPC's own inbox, not from TripAdvisor. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, on the stated embargo date. BCC: DPC Ireland + BfDI + DSB + CERT.at.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 9GDPR Art. 7GDPR Art. 32+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.