Uber Technologies (3 apps): Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Uber Technologies (3 apps).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Uber Technologies (3 apps)
NYSE
2026-06-27
90d ago
Waiting
Critical
Any other app installed on a driver's phone can silently switch off Uber's speed-monitoring safety system with no permission and no visible log entry, a risk that reaches passengers, not just the driver. The Driver app also streams live video and audio from inside the car and frames declining that as a consent choice, even though a driver who says no risks losing income, which is not how real consent is supposed to work.
Rider + Eats + Driver. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. ParametersOverrideRequestBroadcastReceiver, exported with zero caller-identity check in all three apps, reaches HIGH/7.0 on CVSS alone and is held at CRITICAL via blast-radius escalation because the safety systems it can silently disable protect passengers, not only the device owner. Mandatory real-time video/audio streaming from driver cameras, framed as consent inside an employment relationship where refusal risks income, reaches HIGH/8.7 and is held at CRITICAL for the same coercion reason under GDPR Art. 7. A persistent hardware fingerprint (GoogleAdvertisingId + MediaDrmId) bridging worker and consumer identity stays HIGH. Shared Firebase backend between Driver and Eats, and an undocumented Art. 22 algorithmic-management system, correct to MEDIUM. Eight messages sent across 90 days, zero reply of any kind ever received.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32(1)(b)GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)GDPR Art. 5(1)(b)+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.