UNO! Mobile: Privacy & Security Findings

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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for UNO! Mobile.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
UNO! Mobile
NASDAQ
2026-06-24
87d ago
Waiting
Critical
UNO! Mobile hardcodes a Mattel platform secret directly inside the app, something that lets anyone with basic decompiling tools impersonate the official app to Mattel's own systems. Children's voice chat inside the game is routed through a US and Chinese joint service with no approved legal basis for that transfer, and the app starts Facebook tracking before consent, all while the company's own published privacy contact email bounces and cannot actually be reached by parents.
Mattel163 + NetEase JV. F0: privacy@mattel.com = closed Microsoft 365 group, external senders blocked - Art. 12(1) GDPR violation (designated privacy contact unreachable for parents). C1: Mattel platform secret bfhijpzBIM@%(-+, hardcoded verbatim in strings.xml - anyone with apktool can authenticate as the official app. C2: 2× Firebase API keys hardcoded. H1: AgoraRtcSDK.dll + AWSSDK.CognitoIdentity.dll + AWSSDK.S3.dll - children's voice chat via Agora (US/China entity), no Art. 44-49 transfer mechanism. H2: FacebookInitProvider pre-consent on children's app. R2 sent 2026-06-30: legal@mattel163.com + net-easelaw@corp.netease.com + legal@mattel.com + mattel@lionheartsquared.eu (Art.27 rep). DSB in BCC. Deadline 2026-07-05.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 44GDPR Art. 7
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
87d 00h 00m 00s
Published
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This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.