We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Vignetim.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Vignetim
PRIVATE
2026-06-30
109d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Vignetim, a small Austrian app for buying the motorway toll sticker, links your bank account through open-banking code that other apps on your phone could potentially trigger, for a single purchase under a hundred euros. It also sends this purchase to Facebook's US servers before you have consented, even though paying a mandatory government fee has nothing to do with advertising, and it requests microphone and precise GPS access without giving a reason.
com.vignetim.mobile. Private Austrian motorway toll-sticker reseller (React Native, 71,662 smali classes). C1: Firebase Key AIzaSyB5QXCS… + Google Maps Key AIzaSyAM2j7F… hardcoded. H1: Stripe Financial Connections (4 Activities, one exported=true), open-banking bank-account connection on a toll-sticker purchase app (EUR 96.40 one-time purchase). H2: Facebook SDK 3,244 smali classes + FacebookInitProvider pre-consent (US transfer), buying a mandatory government fee is not a Meta ad-conversion event. H3: RECORD_AUDIO + ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION (GPS) with no identifiable purpose. H4: Adjust 306 classes + google_analytics_adid_collection=true + 4x BOOT_COMPLETED. R1 sent 2026-06-30. DSB + EDPS in CC. Embargo 2026-09-28. Deadline 2026-07-14. Six messages over 74 days to two addresses that never bounced drew zero replies of any kind. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 19 days after the 2026-09-28 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
this is a useless cookie banner. it's just here to look like one * we don't use cookies, so there's nothing to consent to. don't let anyone tell you otherwise.two buttons, one closes this and throws some confetti. the other literally does nothing.