We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Visa (Go + Tap to Pay Ready).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Visa (Go + Tap to Pay Ready)
NYSE
2026-07-05
104d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
Visa's own Go app shares accessibility and health-related data with FIFA with no specific notice to the people affected, and routes its built-in AI assistant's traffic through a free public relay server with no accountability if something goes wrong. Separately, Visa's payment-terminal software has an internal payment-processing service that any other app on the device could potentially reach, because it has no permission barrier protecting it, on software that underlies card transactions for Visa, Mastercard, Amex and Discover alike.
com.visa.eva + com.visa.kic.app.kernel - two first-party Visa apps, one combined disclosure. Visa Go: no network security config, no certificate pinning, pre-consent Firebase/Sentry/Flutter auto-init, 7 hardcoded keys, the in-app "Eva" assistant routed through a free public CORS proxy, Art. 9 health/accessibility data shared with FIFA with no product-specific notice. Tap to Pay Ready: confirmed first-party EMV Level 2 kernel host for Visa/Mastercard/Amex/Discover - an exported .KernelMessengerService (BIND_TO_PAYMENT_KERNEL) with zero permission protection. Visa's own HackerOne VDP program explicitly preempted in the disclosure Six messages over 69 days drew two automatic receipts, no human reply and none of the three questions answered. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 14 days after the 2026-10-03 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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