VR Banking / Volksbank (DE): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for VR Banking / Volksbank (DE).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
VR Banking / Volksbank (DE)
Private
2026-06-21
95d ago
Waiting
Critical
The bank's own Play Store listing says no data is collected or shared, but tracking code already built into the app proves otherwise. Worse, SecureGo+, the tool used to confirm bank transfers, is built to trust certificates a scammer could plant on your phone, in the middle of an active wave of QR-code phishing scams against German bank customers that the bank itself had already warned about, which undermines the one check meant to stop a fraudulent transfer. The app also captures your typing rhythm and touch patterns as biometric data through a hidden script.
de.fiduciagad.banking.vr + 5 sibling apps (Fiducia GAD ecosystem - Volksbanken/Raiffeisenbanken DE). All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0. VR SecureGo+ (TAN generator) trusting user-installed CAs reaches HIGH/8.6 on CVSS alone and is held at CRITICAL via blast-radius escalation: this is not theoretical, Volksbank itself had already publicly warned customers about an active quishing campaign exploiting exactly this misconfiguration before this disclosure was sent. Play Store Data Safety declaring "keine Daten erhoben, keine Daten geteilt" - provably false via a deliberately-integrated 441-class AppsFlyer SDK plus a custom backup-exclusion file naming AppsFlyer's own databases - corrects to MEDIUM, as does undisclosed BehavioSec keystroke/touch biometric injection and an excessive filesystem permission in the TAN generator. Six messages sent across 95 days to datenschutz@fiduciagad.de, zero reply of any kind ever received.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 5(2)GDPR Art. 32(1)(a)GDPR Art. 9+1
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
95d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.