We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for WienMobil (AT).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
WienMobil (AT)
PUBLIC
2026-06-26
113d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
Vienna's public-transit app verifies your identity and scans your passport using a company based in Belarus, a country the EU has not approved as safe for personal data, so your biometric and ID information leaves the protection GDPR normally guarantees. The app also logs everything it sends and receives, including your login tokens and ticket purchases, in plain readable text on your own phone.
Regula IDV + Document Reader SDK (Minsk, Belarus): biometric identity verification + passport scanning on Vienna public transit app - Art.9 + Art.44 GDPR (no EU adequacy for Belarus). Chucker HTTP interceptor in production: all API traffic logged in plaintext on device (auth tokens, ticket purchases). Firebase key + Database URL hardcoded, FirebaseInitProvider pre-consent. Wiener Linien replied 2026-07-01 with a generic acknowledgment only, no substantive response to B1-B3. R2 sent naming the pattern + 3 questions + 48h deadline (2026-07-03). Original Magistrat BCC bounced; corrected to Stadt Wien DPO. BCC: DSB + Stadt Wien DPO.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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