Wizz Air (com.wizzair.WizzAirApp): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Wizz Air.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Wizz Air
Private
2026-06-27
90d ago
Silent
Critical
Wizz Air reads the complete biometric chip inside your passport, including your facial photo, using a document-scanning company based in Belarus that is itself under EU sanctions. While scanning, the app can draw an overlay over every other app on your phone, permanently fingerprints your device, and tracks your proximity to other devices over Bluetooth and Wifi, all before you have given any consent.
Regula Document Reader (328 classes, Minsk, Belarus - EU sanctions Reg. 765/2006): reads full ICAO 9303 RFID/NFC chip from EU biometric passports incl. facial photo (Art. 9). SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW: overlay capability over all apps while passport is being scanned. FingerprintJS: persistent device fingerprinting without consent. Urban Airship (273 classes, US): behavioral automation. Bluetooth triple-stack (SCAN+CONNECT+ADVERTISE) + NEARBY_WIFI_DEVICES: multi-channel proximity tracking. CALL_PHONE: auto-dial without user confirmation. FirebaseInitProvider pre-consent (initOrder=100). Firebase key AIzaSyDS7R0APNC3Rfb-qq0y87K3kEP-D2b_nJo hardcoded. NAIH (HU) = lead authority. Five messages sent across 65 days to privacy@/security@/dpo@wizzair.com; not one reply of any kind was ever received. Case closed and published 2026-09-25, on the stated embargo date. BCC: DSB + BfDI + CERT.at + NAIH.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 9GDPR Art. 32
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
90d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.