On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.
387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Wolt.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Wolt
Private
2026-05-25
90d ago
Substantive
Critical
Wolt's courier app had an authentication gap serious enough that no valid session token was actually required to reach a live account channel, and it stayed open after three months and five contact attempts. The company's own customer app passed the same test cleanly, showing this was a choice about where to invest security effort.
A missing-authentication gap (CWE-306: user ID set with a null auth token) exposed the push-notification channel on Wolt's courier app, persisting through five rounds of contact and a free repeat audit. Wolt's own customer-facing app passed the same check cleanly. Wolt redirected a paid-engagement offer to its bug-bounty program instead of confirming the fix.
This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.