report - rfi-irfos
The SquadData SolutionsWorld ModelEvidenceAccess

Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.

This is what a Security engagement produces. See what you’d receive →

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Saylo / Xverse.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Saylo / Xverse
PRIVATE
2026-06-30
109d ago
RESOLVED
CRITICAL
This AI chat app, built by a Shenzhen company operating under a Hong Kong-sounding brand name, ships both a teen mode and a sexually explicit mode inside the same app. Chats are sent to servers in Shanghai even though the privacy policy claims only anonymized, aggregated data ever leaves your device, and the app is built to trust certificates a scammer could plant on your phone.
com.xverse.aistory. XVERSE Technology (Shenzhen) behind an X Original (Hong Kong) shell. Ships a "Teen Mode" AND an NSFW mode in the same binary; chat routed to asset-sh.xverse.cn (Shanghai) + Sensors Analytics while the policy claims only "aggregated, anonymized data" ever leaves the device. Pangle/Mintegral/BIGO pre-consent auto-init. NSC trusts user-installed CAs in production (MITM-friendly). R1 2026-06-30. Eight messages over 68 days, zero replies of any kind, no bounce, no acknowledgment. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 19 days after the 2026-09-28 embargo.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 44PRC National Intelligence Law Art. 7GDPR Art. 9+2
YES
CLOSED
DISCLOSURE
109d 00h 00m 00s
PUBLISHED

this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026

© 2026 RFI-IRFOS  ·  Graz, Austria  ·  GISA 39261441  ·  UID ATU83405245

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