We decompile publicly distributed Android and iOS apps and trace their data flows to real endpoints in real countries. We document what we observe, distinguish verified findings from interpretation, and preserve the evidence behind every conclusion. No company can buy a better result — every organisation is held to the same standard, whether it pays us or not. This permanent disclosure ledger puts that principle into practice.
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found and documented
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
1 of 387 entries · sorted by elapsed ↓
Showing the report for Yesim eSIM.
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSEVIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Yesim eSIM
PRIVATE
2026-07-01
108d ago
RESOLVED
HIGH
Yesim's eSIM app sets every single Google consent option to already agreed before you have any chance to decline, and runs seven separate tracking companies with no consent tool of any kind, sending your usage data straight to US servers. When RFI-IRFOS tried to report this, Yesim's support system responded with automated replies demanding ID numbers and invoking security policy, rather than actually engaging with the report.
com.yesimmobile. Genesis Group AG (Zug, CH). All four Google Consent Mode signals hard-set to "granted" before the user can decline, plus a seven-vendor tracking stack (AppsFlyer, Meta, Amplitude incl. Session Replay, PostHog, Segment, Firebase, Sentry) - no CMP. US transfers, no Art. 27 rep. DEFLECTION BATTLEFIELD: support-bot loop, 3+ auto-replies demanding a "User ID" / "official email" / invoking "security policy" to dodge a coordinated ISO/IEC 29147 disclosure (Art. 12 failure). DSB + EDÖB now visible in CC. R1 2026-07-01. The first substantive reply came after 89 days, followed by fix statements for all three HIGH findings; the fixes are vendor statements and not independently verified. Case closed and published 2026-10-17, 18 days after the 2026-09-29 embargo.
this ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. silence is public. severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius. · github.com/rfi-irfos/android-security-audit-2026
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