Bank Austria (AT) (com.bankaustria.android.olb): Privacy & Security Findings

report - rfi-irfos
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Permanent Disclosure Ledger

The discipline, demonstrated

On behalf of our research partners, we investigate publicly distributed Android and iOS apps: we decompile them, follow their code and data flows, and trace every connection to the servers it reaches. Hundreds of agents work through each app and join the technical evidence into one picture, which our specialists then review and verify.

387+
Android/iOS apps audited
Every app is decompiled at source-code level, not just scanned from outside.
1.04M+
Smali classes read
The full shipped code we have actually read, not an estimate.
262+
Critical findings recorded
Confirmed findings copied to regulators, not theoretical risks.
970+
Weak points found
Third-party tracking we have provably found inside the binary.
567+
Endpoints investigated
Real servers and countries where data actually flows.
132+
SDK instances mapped
Reusable libraries correlated across the entire corpus.
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Showing the report for Bank Austria (AT).
OrganisationNotifiedStatusSevIntel (click to expand)StatutesResolvedDisclosureElapsedReport
Bank Austria (AT)
EURONEXT
2026-06-26
92d ago
CS deflect
Critical
Bank Austria's app allows fully unencrypted connections and is built on a web-view setup that gives an attacker a textbook way to inject malicious code into your banking session. It also hardcodes a database access key directly in the app, and secretly runs a Czech company's tool that reads your typing and touch patterns as biometric data, while routing parts of the app through Huawei's China-linked services inside an EU bank app. UniCredit Bank Austria AG replied on 18 September 2026, declining any substantive response to the five findings and citing a statement submitted separately to the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA), the content of which was never shared with RFI-IRFOS. All three yes/no questions from the 12 September message remain unanswered. Six messages sent across 92 days. All five findings re-scored under CVSS v4.0: the cleartext network configuration and the WebView MITM injection surface remain CRITICAL, the hardcoded Firebase key corrects to HIGH, ThreatMark behavioral biometrics and the Huawei HMS/AGConnect routing both correct to MEDIUM.
NSC cleartextTrafficPermitted=true on banking app. Full Capacitor WebView + InAppBrowser + CordovaHTTP: classic MITM JavaScript injection surface on banking sessions. Firebase key + Realtime Database URL hardcoded (project: bank-austria-mobilebanking). ThreatMark behavioral biometrics (keystroke/touch dynamics, CZ) undisclosed - potential Art.9. Huawei AGConnect + HMS in EU banking app (CN routing). BCC: DSB + FMA.
click to expand
GDPR Art. 32GDPR Art. 9
Yes
Closed
Disclosure
92d 00h 00m 00s
Published
PDF

This ledger is updated in real time as companies respond. Silence is public. Severity is scored primarily by CVSS v4.0, we reserve the right to deviate based on blast radius.